IN THE MATTER OF GEORGE H. CORLISS.

The following is a list of American authorities upon this subject,
divided into two classes, according as they fbllow the first or second
principle. The division is more convenient than always satisfactorv
because some of the cases are like the early English and Pennsylvanian ones, indistinct, and others classed as following the first
principle, intimate that knowledge learned so soon before the agency
that it must be in the agent's mind during his employment, might
be imputed to the principal.
The first principle is followed in Kentucky: TVillis v. F-allette,
4 Met. 196 ; Alabama: fundine v. Bitt's Adn'rs, 14 Ala. 81 ;
Wiley v. Knight, 27 Id. 336; Smith v. Oliver, 31 Id. 39.
(This last case perhaps makes the law a little doubtful); Illinois:
Williams v. Tatnall, 29 Ill. 564; Jllccormick v. Wheeler, 36 Id.
114; New York: National Ins. (o. v. Halsey, 8 N. Y. 271; Wisconsin: 0ongar v. Railroad Co., 24 Wis. 158; South Carolina:
Pritchettv. Sessions, 10 Rich. Law 293.
The second principle is followed in California.: Hunter v.
Watson, 12 Cal. 377; Bierce v. Red Bluff Hotel, 31 Id. 160;
Vermont: Hart v. The Bank. 33 Vt. 252; Georgia: Whitten
v. Jenkins, 34 Ga. 305; Indiana: Day v. Wamsley, 33 Ind.
147; Louisiana: Cummings v. Harsaltania,14 La. Ann. 711 ; New
Hampshire: -Hovey v. Blavchard, 13 N. H. 148; Tennessee:
Bank v. Campbell, 4 Humph. 396.
H1. G. W.

RECENT

AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
IN TIE MATTER OF GEORGE II. CORLISS.
A member of the Centennial Commission holds an office of trust under the
United States which makes him ineligible as a presidential elector.
Ineligibility by reason of holding such office at the time of the election cannot
be removed by a subsequent resignation of the office.
The effect of such ineligibility of the person receiving the highest number or"
votes is to avoid the election. It does not elect the person having the next highea
number of votes.
THE people of Rhode Island having at the election of November
1876, cast the highest number of v6tes for George II. Corliss as a
presidential elector, and his eligibility being questioned on 'tle
ground that he was at the time a Centennial Commissioner under
the United States, the governor requested the opinion of the Sitpreme Court, which was given as follows:-
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To his Excellency, Henry Lippitt, Governor, &c. :We have received from your excellency a communication requesting our opinion on the following questions, to wit:"First. Is the office of commissioner of the United States Centennial Commission such an office of trust or profit under the United
States, as to disqualify the holder for the office of elector of President and Vice President of the United States ?
" Second. If so, does such a candidate for the office of elector
who receives a plurality of the legal, votes given, and declines said
office, create thereby such a vacancy as is provided for in section
7, chapter 11, of the General Statutes ?
" Third. If not, is the disqualification removed by the resignation of said office of trust or profit?
"Fourth. If not, does the disqualification result in the election of the candidate next in vote, or in a failure to elect ?
"Fifth. If by reason of the disqualification of the candidate who
received a plurality of the votes given, there was no election, can
the General Assembly in Grand Committee elect an elector T"
We will give our opinion upon the foregoing questions in the
order in which they are propounded.
1. We think a commissioner of the United States Centennial
Commission holds an office of trust under the United States, and
that he is therefore disqualified for the office of elector of President
and Vice President of the United States.
The commission was created under a statute of the United
States, approved March 3d 1871.
The statute provides for the holding of an exhibition of American and foreign arts, products and manufactures, "1under the
auspices of the government of the United States," and for the constitution of a commission to consist of not more than one delegate
from each state, and from each territory of the United States,
"whose functions shall continue until the close of the exhibition,"
and "whose duty it shall be to prepare and superintend the execution of a plan for holding the exhibition." Under the statute the
commissioners are appointed by the President of the United
States, on the nomination of the governors of the states and territories respectively. Various duties were imposed on the commission, and under the statute provision was to be made for it to have
exclusive control of the exhibition before the President should announce by proclamation the time and place of opening and hold-
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ing the exhibition. By an Act approved June 1st 1872, the duties
and functions of the commission were further increased and defined. That act creates a corporation, called -"The Centennial
Board of Finance," to co-operate with the commission, and to raise
and disburse the funds. It was i be organized under the direction of the commission. The 7th section of the act provides "that
the grounds for the exhibition shall be prepared and the buildings
erected by the said corporation in accordance with plans which
shall have been previously adopted by the United States Centennial Commission, and the rules and regu.ations of said corporation,
governing rates for entrance and admission fees, or otherwise
affecting the rights, privileges or interests of the exhibitors, or of
the public, shall be fixed and established by the United States
Centennial Commission ; and no grant conferring rights or privileges of any description connected with said grounds or buildings,
or relating to said exhibition or celebration, shall be made without the consent of the United States Centennial Commission, and
said commission shall have power to control, change or revoke all
said grants, and shall appoint all judges and examiners, and award
all premiums." The tenth section of the act provides that "it
,shall be the duty of the United States Centennial Commission to
supervise the closing up of the affairs of said corporation, to audit
its accounts, and submit in a report to the President of the United
States, the financial results of the Centennial Exhibition."
It is apparent from this statement, which is but partial, that
the duties and functions of the commission were various, delicate
and important; that they could be successfully performed only by
men of large experience and knowledge of affairs; and that they
were not merely subordinate and provisional, but in the highest
degree authoritative, discretionary and final in their character.
We think that persons performing such duties and exercising such
functions in pursuance of statutory direction and authority, are
not to be regarded as mere employees, agents or committee men, but
that they are, properly speaking, officers, and that the places which
they hold are offices. It appears, moreover, that they were originally regarded as officers by Congress; for the act under which
they were appointed declares (see. 7) that "no compensation for
services shall be paid to the commissioners or other officers provided by this act from the treasury of the United States." The
only other officers provided for were the "alternates" appointed to
VOL. XXV.-3
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serve as commissioners when the commissioners were unable to
attend.
We think, too, the office is an office "under the United States.~
It was created by Act of Congress, and all its powers and duties
were conferred and imposed by Congress. It was created not for
the service of any particular state or section, but in the interest of
all the states united. The commissioners were appointed under
the act by the President, and were commissioned like other United
States oflicers. There seems to be no room for doubt upon this
point.
Is it an " office of trust or profit under the United Statbs ?"
It is not an office of profit under the United States, for the commissioners are not entitled to any pay from the United States, nor to
any perquisite or emolument under any law of the United States.
But we think it is an office of trust. It is true that originally the
United States had no pecuniary interest in the exhibition. The
commissioners, however, were to be intrusted with a large supervisory and regulative control of the property sent for exhibition,
and from the time the government gave its sanction to the exhibition, and especially after the President issued, his proclamation,
the honor and reputation of the United States were pledged for
its proper management to its own citizens and to foreign nations.
From that time the honor and reputation of the United States were
largely in the keeping of the commissioners; and in this view there
was a very delicate and important trust -. ;posed in them. It would
be a narrow and we think an impropc: interpretation, to hold that
an office is an office of trust only when the officer has the handling
of public money or property, or the care and oversight of some
pecuniary interest of the government. But, even if it were so,
there comes a time when the United States did become pecuniarily
interested in the exhibition by the appropriation of a million and
a half of dollars for it, to be paid out of the profits if any should
accrue ; and when, also, valuable property belonging to the United
States was exhibited on the exhibition grounds. We repeat that
the office is, in our opinion, an office of trust.
There is another point deserving mention before we pass to the
next question. By the Act approved June 1st 1872, the commission was incorporated under the name of " The United States Centennial Commission." Did this in any manner terminate or alter
its official character. We think not. The change was merely
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formal and made, we suppose, to facilitate the transaction of business. Indced, in the papers annexed to the report of the commission to Congress, it appears, that the commission had assumed
the name of the United States Centennial Commission before its
incorporation; and that the Act of June 1st 1872, was passed on its
recommendation. ' We do not see therefore why the commissioners
were not as much United States officers after as before their
incorporation.
2. We think a Centennial Commissioner, who was a candidate
for the office of elector, and received a plurality of the votes, does
not by declining the office create such a vacancy as is provided
for in Gen. Stats., ch. 11, sect. 7. Section 7 is as follows:" If any electors, chosen as aforesaid, shall, after their said
election, decline the said office, or be prevented by any cause from
serving therein, the other electors, when met in Bristol in pursuance
of this chapter, shall fill such vacancies, and shall file a certificate
in the secretary's office of the person or persons by them appointed."
Before any person can decline under this section he must first
be elected, and no person can be elected who is ineligible, or in
other words, incapable of being elected. "Resignation," siid Lord
CocKU N, C. J., in The Queen v. Blizard, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 55,
"cimplies that the person resigning has been elected into the office'
he resigns. ' A man cannot resign that which he is not entitled to
and which he has no right to occupy."
3. We think the disqualification is not removed by the resignation of the office of trust, unless'the office is resigned before the
election. The language of the Constitution is that no person
"holding an office of trust or profit under the United States shall
be appointedan elector." Under our law (Gen. Stats., ch. 11, sects.
1 and 2), the election- by the people constitutes the appointmenf.
The duty of the governor is to "1examine and count the votes, and
give notice to the elector."' He merely.ascertains-he does not
complete-the appointment. A resignation, therefore, after the
election is too late to le effectual.
4. We think the disqualification does not result in the election
of the candidate next in vote, but in a failure to elect.
In England it has been held that where electors vote for an
ineligible candidate, knowing his disqualification, their votes are not
to be counted, any more than if they were thrown for a (lead man
or the man in the moon; and that in such a case the opposing
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candidate, being qualified, will be elected, although he has had a
ininoity of the votcs: King v. Hawkins, 10 East 210 ; Beg. v.
Goaks, 3 El. & 13. 253. But even in England, if the disqualification is unknown the minority candidate is not entitled to the office,
the election being a failure : Queen v. Hiornes, 7 Ad. & E. 960;
.Rex v. Bridge, 1 1\. & Selw. 76. And it has been held that to
entitle the minority candidate to the office it is not enough that the
electors know of the facts which amount to a disqualification, unless
they likewise know that they amount to it in point of law: The
Queen v. The MAayor, 'e., Law Rep. 3 Q. B. 629.
In this country the law is certainly not more favorable to the
minority candidate: State v. Giles, 1 Chandler (Wis.) 112; State
v. Smith, 14 Wis. 497; Saunders v. Haynes, 18 Cal. 145; People
v.
ilute, 50 N. Y. 451. The question submitted to us does not
allege or imply that the electors, knowing the disqualification,
voted for the ineligible candidate in wilful defiance of the law;
and certainly, in the absence of proof, it is not to be presumed that
they so voted. The only effect of the disqualification, in our opinion, is to render void the election of the candidate who is disqualified, and to leave one place in the electoral college unfilled.
5. Our statute -(Gen. Stat., ch. 11, sect. 5,) provides that "if
by reason of the votes being equally divided or otherwise, there
shall not be an election of the number of electors, to which the state
may be entitled, the governor shall forthwith convene the Genera.l
Assembly at Providence for the choice of electors to fill such
vacancy by an election in Grand Committee." We think this provision covers the contingency which has happened, and that, therefore, the General Assembly in Grand Committee can elect an elector
to fill up the number to which the state is entitled. The law of
the United States provides.that "whenever any state has held an
election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make
choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed
on a subsequent day, in such a manner as the legislature of such
state may direct :" U. S. Gen. Stats., p. 21, sect. 134.
THOMAS DURFEE,

W. S. BURGES,
E. R. POTTER,
CHARLES MATTESOY.
STINESS, J., transmitted to the governor a separate opinion
upon the first question, maintaining " that under the original act
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no C office of trust under the United States' was created; that
by the second act, in which duties are confided to the commission
in the nature of a trust, the corporation is the trustee, and not the
members as such; that at the date of the election of electors a
member of that commission did not hold such an office as rendered
him ineligible as an elector."
Upon the remaining questions he concurred with the other justices.'
The constitution commits to the states
the power of choosing electors, with
the restriction that "no senator or representative, or person holding an office
of trust or profitunder the United States,
shall he appointed an elector." In accordance with the provisions of the constitution upon this subject the several
states have uniformly regulated the
manner of appointment of electors, and
have the exclusive right so to do. In all
the states but one the electors are
chosen by the people.
I. The question whether persons
holding such disqualifying offices can,
by resigning their offices under the
United States after their election by
the peop'e, qualify themselves to act as
electors for president and vice president,
has arisen in several states besides
Rhode Island, and many good lawyers
have expressed the opinion that this
might be done. It is difficult to see
upon what foundation such an opinion
can Test. The authority of the courts
is clearly against it.
In Searey v.
Grow, 13 Cal. 1i7, this question was
before the Supreme Courfof California,
at that time composed of Judge FIELD,
now one of the judges of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and judges
COPE and B.ALDWINr.
In delivering
the opinion oftbe court Judge BALDWIN
says : "The proceeding is a contest for
the office of sheriff. Grow, the appellant, was returned as elected to that
office. * * * The ground of contest is,

that at the time of the election, he was
postmaster of the town of Yreka. * * *
The constitution * * * provides 'No
person holding any lucrative office
under the United States or any other
power, shall be eligible to any civil
office of profit under the state.' The
counsel for the appellant contends that
the true meaning of the constitution is
that the federal officer described, is forbidden to take any civil office while so
holding the other ; but that he is capable of receiving 9otes cast for him, so
as to give him a right to take the state
office upon or after resigning the federal
office. But we think the plain meaning
of the words quoted is the opposite of
this construction."
The opinion then
goes on to say that the power to choose
was in the people and their selection
of a candidate gave him the title to the
office and all the title he could have.
The general doctrine that the title to
an elective office is derived from the
people and is complete when a majority
of their votes is cast for a candidate,
cannot be questioned.
In Mayiffield v. Moore, 53 Ill.
428,
one question was whether the successful
contestant for the office of sheriff was
entitled to recover from the contestee,
who had taken possession of the office,
under a certificate of election, the fees
of the office from the time of the election. The court held that the contestant
was entitled to recover the fees for the
entire time the contestee was in posses-

- The governor, upon receipt of this opinion, called a special session of the
legislature, which met and filled the vacany.-ED. Am. LAW REG.
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sion of the offire, uting this language :

poiittnent the candidate ik holding an
office under the United State%, tile apof the votei were cast for appellant, at pointment ii in violation of this provithe election held in pursuance to law, sion of the constitution, and is void.
he became legally and fully entitled to The language is not that he shall not
the office. The title
%%as as complete
hold, but that he shall not 1' be apthen as it ever was, and no subsequent
pointed," and operates upon the very
act lent the least force to the right to first step in the process of holding. li0
tile place. The commission was cvi- can hold only by appointment and the
dence of the title, butnot the title. The constitution says he shall not be nptitle was conferred hv the people, and pointed. The ruling in the principal
the evidence of the right by the law."
case upon this point seems to be clear
The same doctrine is laid down hy tile both on principle and on authority.
Supreme Court of Indiana : State ex
II. What then ? Does the candidate
rel. Cornwell v. Allen, 21 Ind. 516;
receiving the next highest number of
Shannon v. Baker, 33 Ind. 390 ; and votes become entitled to the office, or is
in Missouri: Siate v. Steer., 44 Mo.
there an entire failure to elect ?
223.
In The King v. Monday, Cowper 537,
In The Pcple v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 55, it was held, on the authority of some
it is said that it is the vote of the people older, but unreported cases, that the
that confers title to an elective office.
votes for an ineligible candidate being
"It is not the canvass, or estimate, or
nullities, the next highest candidate in
certificate which determines tie right. votes, being eligible, was elected.
These are only evidences of the right."
In R,,x Y. lawkins, 10 East 211,
The
presidential electors being ithere had been an election for alderman
elected by the people, derive their title of the borough of Saltash, at which
to the office from the vote given on the Hawkins was a candidate, and after the
(lay cf the election ; if not qualified to
poll had been opened notice was pubbe chosen then, they cannot afterward licly given that lie was ineligible. The
qualify. The certificates they receive of
Court of Queen's Bench held upon quo
their election confer no title to the wrarranto that the votes given for Hawoffice, nor authority to exercise its pre- kins after notice of his ineligibility were
rogatives. They may compel the issu- nullities and that the next highest can.ance of the certificates by an appeal to didate was elected. Upon appeal to
the courts, but it will hardly be said that the Iouse of Lords the judgment was
the courts can confer upon them the affirmed : 11awkins Y. Rex, 2 Dow 124.
title to the office; neither can the goThis case settled the law of England
vernor or other officer who issues the and it so remains to the present, hut tite
certificate, since the law has not con- hardship of the rule and its manifest
ferred upon him the power of appoint- repugnance to the first principles upon
ment.
Not being capable of being which elections are founded, have made
chosen, at the time the choice was to the courts astute in practically setting
be made, the candidate could by no it aside by extreme strictness on the
after act give validity to the choice. subject of notice. The latest case on
The constitution does not say, that no the subject is The Queen v. The MAayor,
person holding an office under the 6-c., of Tewkesbatrq, Law Rep. 3 Q. B.
United States shall vote, as an elector,
629 (1868).
In that case the mayor,
for president and vice president, but
one Blizard, acted as returning officer
that no such person shall " be appointed at an election at which liewas himself
an elector." If at the time of the ap- a candidate for the office of councillor,
"Under

the law, !-o,oon as a majority
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and received and counted votes for himself. Upon quo warraaohe was ousted,
and thereupon the next highest candidate sued out a mandamus against the
corporation commanding them to admit
him as a member of tile council. Tile
Queen's Bench declared, however, that
the votes for Blizard could not be taken
as nullities unless the voters not only
had notice of the facts that Blizard was
at the same time a candidate and the
returning officer of the poll, but also of
the legal result that he was thereb, disqual fied. Knowledge of the facts, the
court said, was not necessarily knowledge of fheir legal consequences, and
Bra-casntvRN, J , expended an amount
of ingenuity in getting around the"
maxim ignorantialirqis nemincm ecusat,
quite at variance with the usual straightforward and vigorous logic of that very
aminent judge.
The rule therefore in England may
be stated to be that the second highest
is elected only where it is affirmatively
shown that the voters for the candidate
highest in votes had such actual know-"
ledge of his ineligibility that they must
be taken to have wilfally thrown away
their votes. Wherever the affirmative
proof falls short of this standard the
only result of the ineligibility of the
highest candidate is to render the election void.
In Indiana the rule has been held
more in accordance with the older English cases; it being decided in Gulick v.
New, 14 Ind. 93, not only that the
second candidate is elected where the
first is ineligible, but that a constitutional clause and a public statute are
notice of the ineligibility. This has been
followed in Carson v. McPhetridge, 15
Ind. 327, and Price v. I3akcr, 41 Inl.
*72 ; and appears to be the settled rule'
in that state.
In New York, the case of The People
ex rel. Furman v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451
(1872). follows the English rule exactly, as laid down in Regina v. Mayor of,

Tewkze.bur ct a1 ., al ready cited. FOT.GER,
J., after handling the maxim iflnoraati
jinis, &c,, it must. be conceded rather
more successfully than BLACKaBURN,

J., sums up a careful examination of
the subject thus: "We think that the rule
is this : the existence of the fact which
disqualifies and of the law which makes
that fact operate to disqualify, mu't be
brought home so closely and so clearly
to tile knowledge or notice of the elector, as that to give his vote therewith
indicates an intent to waste it." It was
accordingly held in that case that the
existence of a public statute creating
the ineligibility was not sttfficient evidence of notice to the voters.
With the exception of the foregoing
cases, the English rule has not been followed in this country, but, on the contrary, there is 7a clear current of Ameritan opinion to the contrary. The
earliest case in which the question appears to have arisen is The State v.'
Giles, I Chandler (Wis.) 112 (1849),
in which the opinion was positively expressed (though perhaps not absolutely
required by the case), that without any
reference to knowledge or notice on the
part of the voters of a disqualification
of the person highest in votes, the only
effect was to avoid the election and not
to elect the second candidate. In The
State ex rel. Off v. Smuth, 14 Wis. 497
(1861), the point arose directly and
was expressly decided in accordance
with State v. Giles.
In Saunders v. Ilaynes, 13 Cal. 145,
the question again arose, and was decided in the same way. In delivering
the opinion, BALDWIN, J., says :
"It will be observed that tile point
of this defence is that the votes cast for
Turner, supposing lie received the highubt number, were nuilities, becau-e uf
his assumed ineligibility. But we do
not so consider. Although some old
cases may be found affirming this doctrine, we think that the better opinion
at this day is that it is not correct.
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11The celebrated controversy in the
British Parliament between Wilkes and
Luttrel has given rise to much discussion ; and the opinions of jurists and
statesmen have been somewhat divided.
But the prevailing opinion, English and
American, of modern times, seems to
be against the precedent established in
that case. In the case of llaltmaa v.
.Mdon, 10 Cal. 47, Mr. Justice FIELD
clearly intimates his opinion in favor
of tile principle that tile votes given for
an ineligible candidate are not to be
counted for the next highest candidate
on tile poll. * * *

"Our legislative precedents seem to
be the same way. Upon principle, we
think tle law should

e so ruled.

An

election is the deliberate choice of a
majority or plurality of tile electoral
body. This is evidenced by the Totes
of the electors. But if a majority of
those voting, by mistake of law or fact,
happen to cast their votes upon an ineligible candidate, it by no means follows
that the next to him on tihe poll should
receive the office. If this be so, a candidate might be elected who received
only a small portion of the votes, and
who never could have been elected at
all bat for this mistake. Tile votes are
not less legal votes because given to a
person in whose behalf they cannot be
counted ; and the person who is the next
to him on the list of candidates does not
receive a plurality of votes because his
competitor was ineligible. The vbtes
cast for the latter, it is true, cannot be
counted for him ; but ttat is no reason
why they should, in effect, be counted
for the former, who, possibly, could
never have received them. It is fairer,
more just, and more consistent with the
theory of our institutions, to hold the
votes so cast as merely ineffectual for
the purpose of an election, than to give
them the effect of disappointing the
popular will, and electing to office a
man whose pretensions the people had
designed to reject."

So in Cmanniaoealtlh ex rel. 31cLaughlin v. Chidey, 56 Penn. St. 270 (1867),
STRONG, J., delivering the opinion of
the court (from which, however, TuomPsON, C. J., dissented), says :",Now what interest has the relator
in the question lie attempts to raise?
* * * Surely it cannot be maintained
that in any possible contingency the
office can be given to him. The votes
cast at an election for a person who is
disqualified from holding an office are
not nullities. They cannot be rejected
by inspectors or thrown out of the count
by tile return judges. The disqualified
person is a person still, and every vote
thrown for him is formal. * * * Under
institutions such as ours are, there is
even greater reason (than in England)
for holding that a minority candidate is
not entitled to the office if lie who received the largest number of votei is
disqualified."
In Sublett v. Bedwelt, 47 Miss. 266,
SIMRALL,

J.,

says :-

It cannot be said that the candidate
has been elected unless lie has received
a majority of the legal votes cast ; he
is not the choice of the people. If the
majorit. make choice of a candidate
under some personal disability disqualifying him from taking and enjoying
the office, the utmost that can be said of
it is that there has been no election."
To the same effect are the decisions
in Georgia : State v. Swearingen, 12
Ga. 23; Maine: Opinion of Supreme
Court, 38 Me. 597; Michigan : People
ex ret. Crawford v. M3oliter, 23 Mich.
341 ; Missouri : State v. Vail, 53 Mo.
97; Louisiana: State v. Gastinel, 18
La. Ann. 517; 20 Id. 114; Fish v.
Collens, 21 Id. 289 ; and in Kentucky,
where, however, the subject is regulated
by statute : Cochran v. Jones, 14 Am.
Law Reg. N. S. 222.
Tie result of tile cases on this subject is summed up (before the adjudication of several of the foregoing), by
Judge DILLON in the following lan11

LEGG

ET AL. v.

MAYOR, &c., OF ANNAPOLIS.

gnge : "Unless the votes for an ineligible person arc expressly declared to
be void, the effect of such a person receiving a majority of the votes cast is
according to the weight of American
authority, and the reason of the matter,
* * * that a new election must be held,
and not to give the office to the qualified
person having the next highest number
of votes :" Dillon on M~unicipal Corp.,
sect. 135 ; and Judge COOLEY (1a1o

There are a considerable number of
legislative precedents on this subject
under the usual clause in American
constitutions making legislative bodies
the exclusive judges of elections of their
members. Some of them are cited by
Judge STnOXG in Commonwalth v.
Cluley, 56 Penna. 270, aind otheri
in Sablett v. Bedwe'l, 47 Miss. 266,
and in the argument of counsel in
Peopye v. Clute, 50 N. Y. The majority
of them appear to follow what we have
stated as the American rule, but they
are by no means uniform, and we have
not thought it worth while to cite or
In the language of
review them.

before many of the cases herein cited
were decided) states the law without
qualification, that "without a plurality
no one can be chosen to a public office ;
and if the person receiving the highest
number of votes was ineligible, the FOLGEir, J., in Peop!e v. Chlte, " They
cannot be said to afford any precise or
votes cast for him will still be effectual
so far as to prevent the opposing canuseful principle, * * * and they are
didate being chosen, and the election not so conclusive and satisfactory as
judicial determinations."
must be considered as having failed:"
J. T. M.
Const. Limitations 620.

Court of A~peals of Maryland.
JAMES LEGG

ET AL.

v. MAYOR, &c., OF ANNAPOLIS.

A valid statute can only be passed in the manner prescribed by the Constitution,
and when the provisions of that instrument, in regard to the manner of enacting
laws, are wholly disregarded in respect to a particular act, it must be declared a
nullity, though having the forms of authenticity.
Whenever a question arises in a court of law as to the existence of a statute, or
as to the time when it took effect, or as to its precise terms, the judges who are
called upon to decide such question, have a right t6 resort to any source of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear
and satisfactory answer to such question ; the best and most satisfactory evidence
in all cases being required.
An Act of Assembly which can be shown byundoubted and competent evidence,
never to have passed the two houses of the legislature, substantially, as it was
approved by the governor, and sealed with the great seal, and published, is a
nullity ; and it is the duty of the court so to declare it.
If the answer to an application for a mandamus contains or sets up any sufficient reason for refusing the writ, though it be in other respects evasive and irresponsive, it should not be quashed as a whole.
Where the answer to a petition for a mandamus is quashed, the allegations of
the petition are not authorized to be taken pro confesso; nor is the judge authorized to enter judgment as by default for want of answer, or by nil dicit. The case
must be heard cx pare, and the mind of the judge satisfied both as to the law and
the facts, before the writ can be ordered.
On an application for a mandamus, the right to which depends upon the quesVoL. XXV.-4
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%ion whether a certain public statute, appearing in the statute hook, with all the
pre.cribed forms of autheutlcatioii, is talid or not, the oms (if proof is upon the
applicants, with a strong presumption against the right asserted by them ; and
before that right can be rccognised and judicially declared in the face of a public
statute, having alo.t a conclusive presumption in its support, the applicants are
bound to furnish the most conclusive evidence of the truth of the facts upon which
they rely to invalidate the statute.
It is not competent for parties, though engaged in an adverse litigation, to procure a public statute, affecting the public interest, to be declared a nullity, upon
their mere allegations and admissions, us to the manner in which the statute was
enacted by the legislature. Proof of a higher and more reliable character should
b. required in such case.
MIandamus is a writ commanding the performance of some act or duty therein
spe, :tied, in the performance of which the applicant for the writ is interested, or
by tie non-performance of which lie is aggrieved or injured. As a preventive
remedy simply, it is never used. Its use i. confined to those occasions where the
law has establismed no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government
there ought to be one.
A mandamus does not lie to prevent a nerson from being disturbed or molested
in tile exercise of the functions and powers tiertaintng to his office.

from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel county.
The appellees, by their petition, represented that they were the
corporate officers of the city of Annapolis; and in the exercise of
their powers as such, they had appointed a police force, which was
then in the discharge of its duties.
That the governor had undertaken to appoint the appellants,
under the title of " The Board of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City," claiming the right so to do under a pretended law,
entitled "An Act to add sub-sections to Article H. of the Code
of Public Local Laws, title Anne Arundle County, sub-title Annapolis, to provide a board of Police Commissioners for Annapolis.
City," chapter 421, which purports to have been approved by the
Governor on the 11th of April 1874, in the presence of the Speaker
of the House of Delegates and the President of the Senate; and
the petitioners charged that said pretended law was not a law, the
same never having been passed or approved as required by the.
constitution of the state of MNaryland, to give validity thereto.
They charged that a bill, having for its object the appointment
of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City, was introduced in
the House of Delegates, at the late session of the General Assembly
of 1874, and was passed by the House of Delegates on the 80th
of March 1874, and sent to the Senate; that it was reported from
a committee of the Senate, on the 3d of April 1874, to the Senate,
but that on or about the 6th of April 1874, before any vote had
APPEAL
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been taken on said bill by the Senate, it was lost, or mislaid or
purloined, and removed from the Senate Chamber, and was never
afterwards before the Senate for its action. That after the removal
of the said bill had been discovered, a draft of another bill for the
appointment of Police Commissioners for Annapolis City was
prepared, and upon the said draft of a bill, entries were made,
professing to be in conformity with the action of the House of
Delegates upon the bill which had been lost or mislaid, &e., and
also entries professing to be in conformity with the action of the
Senate ; that the said draft thus prepared, was presented to the
Senate, and the Senate afterwards passed the same by yeas and
nays; that the said draft of a bill thus passed by the Senate, was
not the bill which had been passed by the House of Delegates, but
was different in fact and in its contents therefrom ; and that the
bill, or draft of a bill, thus passed by the Senate alone, was afterwards submitted to the governor, and was that which it was alleged
was approved by him on the 11th of April 1874.
The petitioners filed an authenticated copy of the pretended law-,
so as aforesaid signed by the governor, and the original draft of a.
law, which passed the House of Delegates and was, as heretofore
charged, lost or mislaid, &c., which original draft of the bill "in
the envelope now surrounding the same and directed to the Counsellor of the City of Annapolis, was received by him through the
post-office of Annapolis, on the 14th of May 1874, but from what
source the same was received, was wholly unknown to the petitioners.
The petitioners further charged that the said draft of a bill so
passed by the Senate of Maryland, was not signed by the governor
of Maryland on the 11th of April 1874, in the presence of the
Speaker of the House of Delegates, and the President of the Senate,
as was endorsed thereon; and the said draft of a bill was not
signed at all by the governor, until Tuesday, the 14th of April
1874, and after the time limited by the constitution of the state
of Maryland, for the signing and approving by the governor of
bills passed by the General Assembly of Maryland, had expired.
The further facts appear in the opinion.
Hfenry Aisquith and Win. H. Tuck, for appellants.
J. Wirt Randall, Alexander B. Hagner and Prank H. Stockett,
for appellees.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALVEY, J.-In this case, application was made by the appellees
for the writ of mandamus to be directed to the appellants, and
upon that application a rule was made requiring the appellants to
answer by a named day. The appellants answered, but the answer
being regarded as insufficient, was, upon motion of the appellees
quashed; and thereupon the appellees moved that judgment be
given in their favor, for want of an answer or plea, and that a
peremptory writ of mandamus be granted without delay against
the appellants. This motion was granted, and the writ ordered
to be issued. It is from that order that the present appeal was
taken.
The case has been very fully and ably argued, and many questions have been discussed of peculiar interest and nicety ; but of
the questions presented we propose to decide only those which
seem to be leading and controlling in the controversy.
1. Whether any evidence be admissible to show that an act of
the last legislature, ch. 421, to provide for the appointment Qf a
board of police commissioners for the city of Annapolis, was not
constitutionally enacted, that act having all the forms of authentication prescribed by the constitution ?
2. If evidence be admissible for such purpose, whether, after
quashing the answer of the appellants, the court below should have
heard the evidence to impeach the validity of the statute, instead
of taking the allegations of the appellees as confessed for want
of answer thereto ?
3. And finally, whether the allegations of the appellees, assuming them to have been either confessed or proven, constituted a
proper case for the issue of the writ of mandamus ?
The determination of these questions would seem to embrace
all the material points of controversy between the parties.
1. While the presumption arising from the proper forms of authentication of a statute is very strong that the statute was regularly and constitutionally enacted by the legislature, the authorities
maintain that such presumption may be overcome by competent
evidence, and the statute be shown to have never been constitutionally enacted. And this court have so decided, in the case of
Berry v. The Drum Point Bailroad Co., 41 Md. 446. A valid
statute can only be passed in the manner prescribed by the constitution, and when the provisions of that instrument, in regard to
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the manner of enacting laws, are wholly disregarded, in respect to
a particular act, it would seem to be a necessary conclusion that
the act, though having the forms of authenticity, must be declared
to be a nullity. Otherwise the express mandatory provisions of
the constitution would be of no avail or force whatever.
In the ease to which we have just referred, of Berry v. The
Drum Point Railroad Co., we decided, adopting the conclusion
of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Gardner v. The
Collector, 6 Wall. 499, that whenever a question arises in a court
of law as to the existence of a statute, or as to the time when it
took effect, or as to its precise terms, the judges who are called
upon to decide such questions, have a right to resort to any source
of information which in its nature is capable of conveying to the
judicial mind a clear and satisfactory answer to such question;
the best and most satisfactory evidence in all cases being required.
If then it be true, as alleged in the petition of the appellees,
that the'act in question never in fact passed both houses of the
legislature, substantially, as it was approved by the governor,
sealed with the great seal, and published, and that fact can be
clearly and indubitably established by competent evidence, it
follows that the act is a nullity, and the court would have so to
declare it.
2. We come now to the second question, that is, as to the proper
node of proceeding upon quashing the answer of the appellants.
The appellants contend that their answer was improperly
quashed ; that it contained sufficient cause against the issuing of
the writ, and though it was evasive in some of its parts, it should
not have been quashed as a whole.
According to present practice, as prescribed by the Code, art.'
59, the answer to the applicant's petition, filed under rule, stands
in the place of the return to the alternative writ under former
practice, and it is not required to be more specific or certain in
the statement of the defences upon which the defendant relies,
than was required in the return to the alternative writ. It was
not essential, in order to support the return, that every part of it
should be good; it was sufficient if enough was made to appear to
constitute a full justification for what was complained of, or a good
legal reason why the mandamus should not be issued; and if a
return was good in part, and bad in part, the good part could be
separated from that which was bad: Rex v. Archbishop of York,
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G Term Rep. 493; Rex v. Jlfayor of London, 3 B. & Adol 268.
If therefore the answer in this case contained or set up any sufficiezit reason for refusing the mandamus, though it was in other
respects evasive and irresponsive, it should not have been quashed
as a whole.
Bat assuming, without deciding, that the answer was properly
quashed, what was then the proper mode of proceeding, in the
absence of an answer. The Code, art. 59, sect. 9, provides that
"If the defendant shall neglect to file his answer to the petition
by the day named in the order of the judge, after being served
with notice thereof, the said judge shall thereupon proceed to hear
the said motion exparte, within five days thereafter, and if lie shall
be of the opinion that the facts and Taw of the case authorize the
granting of a mandamus as prayed, he shall thereupon, without
delay, order a peremptory mandamus to issue ;" and by the next
succeeding section it is provided, that if the judge shall upon such
exparte ltearing.be of opinion that the facts and law of the case
do not authorize the granting of a mandamus, he shall dismiss the
petition with costs.
In this case, we think the learned judge below fell into error in
supposing that he was required to act upon the allegations of the
petition as if they had been confessed, or to assume that they were
true, because the appellants had failed to make sufficient answer
The statute, according to our understanding of it, doe3
to them'.
not contemplate such a mode of proceeding. From the very
nature of the remedy itself, and the circumstances under which i4
is ordinarily applied for, it would seem to be proper that the judge
should not only be able to see that the application presents a proper
case for the issue of the writ, but that the facts upon which the
application is based are made to appear with reasQnable certainty,
ttence, in the absence of an answer, the judge is required to hear
the case ex parte ; t"at is, to allow the applicant to produce his
proof, to satisfy the mind of the judge .that the allegations of the
petition are founded in truth; .nd if upon such ex parte hearing
the judge should be of opinion that the.faqts and law of the case
authorize the granting of the writ, he orders it to issue, but if not.
of that opinion he is required to dismiss, the petition with costsThe allegations of the petition are not authorized to be taken pro
eo 'fsso;nor is the judge authorized to enter judgment as by
defatlt for want of answer, or by nil dicit. The case must be
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heard, and the mind of the judge satisfied, both as to the law and
the facts, before the writ can be ordered.
Here, the question upon which the right depends is, whether a
certain public statute, appearing in the statute book, with all the
prescribed forms of authentication, is valid or not. By the petition
of the appellees facts are alleged, which, if true, and are proven
by competent and sufficient evidence, will require the court to
declare the statute void. But the question whether a statute has
been constitutionally enacted by the legislature cannot be tried
upon mere ex parte affidavits, nor upon any other than the best
and most reliable evidence. As opposed to the allegations of the
petition, the statute itself, as published by authority, furnished at
least a strong prindfacie cause against granting the writ; and
of the statute the court was bound to take judicial notice. The
onus of proof was upon the appellees, with a strong presumption
against the right asserted by them, and before that right could be
recognised and judicially declared, in the face of a public statute,
having almost a conclusive presumption in its support, the appellees
were bound to furnish the most conclusive evidence of the truth
of the facts upon which they rely to invalidate the statute. It is
a question as to the existence of a law, upon which the rights and
obligations of the parties, and also of the public, depend, and the
inquiry proposed is one addressed exclusively to the judge. It is
ff6t a question to be submitted to the jury, but it is the duty of
the judge or court, whenever such a question is mnde, to exact the
most convincing evidence, and to declare the statute assailed valid
or invalid, as the judicial mind may conclude, upon the evidence
produced: De Bow v. The People, 1 Denio 9.
. To allow a public statute to-be invalidated and set aside upon the
mere allegations of a party, though, under oath, as to the manner
of its enactment, would be not only an unprecedented proceeding;
but one fraught with the most serious consequences. Indeed, the
court would not be justified, in such case as this, in taking the
admissions or confessions of the defendant as evidence upon which
to declare'a public statute a nullity. The public are interested in
maintaining the statute, and it is not competent to'parties, though
engaged in an adverse litigation, to procure a public statute,
affecting the public interest, to be declared a nullity, upon their
mere allegations and admissions, as to the manner in which the
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statute was enacted by the legislature. Proof of a lglier and
more reliable character should be required in such case.
3. The next and last question is, whether the petition of the
appellecs presented a case proper for the issue of a mandamus;
and this question is important to be decided, as upon its decision
depends whether the case shall be remanded, or be dismissed,
without further proceeding.
According to the allegations of the petition in this case, the
appellees are in office exercising all the duties and functions thereof,
and the appellants, though appointed to the new office created by
the statute of 1874, ch. 421, have not entered upon the duties of
that office, and have in no manner interfered with the appellees
in the exercise of the office they hold. The appellants are not
charged with withholding anything that pertains to the office of
the appellees, nor even with exercising powers and privileges that
are in conflict with those exercised by the latter. It is alleged
that the appellants have been appointed by the governor under the
Act of 1874, as Police Commissioners, and that, as the appellees
are informed, they have accepted the appointment, or intend to
accept the same, "and undoubtedly propose and design, unless
restrained from so doing, to exercise all and singular the powers
pretended to be conferred on them as a Board of Police Commissioners, by said pretended law." The petition then proceeds to
pray that a writ of mandamus may issue to the appellants, " commanding them, and each of them, to surcease and desist from exercising, or assuming to exercise, in any manner, any power or
authority or jurisdiction under the said pretended act, by the
appointment of any police or otherwise; and further commanding
them, and each of them, to abstain from interfering or attempting
to interfere, with the police department established by your petitioners, under their said charter and ordinances, and from hindering,
obstructing, resisting or opposing, the executive officers of said city,
in the exercise of their lawful powers, and in the discharge of their
official duties."
This is the usual prayer for an injunction, in a bill in equity,
to restrain an unlawful interference with rights; but we are not
aware of any precedent for the use of the writ of mandamus to
accomplish such a purpose. Mandamus is a writ commanding the
performance of some act or duty, therein specified, in the performance of which the applicant for the writ is interested, or by the
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non-performance of which he is aggrieved or injured. Reg v.
Bishop of Chichester, 2 Ell. & Ell. 209. But as simply a preventive remedy it has never been used, so far as we have Leen
able to discover. The nature of the writ, and the end for which
it was framed, direct upon what occasions it should be used. It
was introduced to prevent disorder from a failure of justice, and
defect of police. Its use is therefore confined to those occasions
where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in
justice and good government there ought to be one: 6 Bac. Abr.,
tit. Oland. 418. But there can be no want of remedy for any
illegal or improper interference with the exercise of the powers
and duties legally pertaining to the office of the appellees.
In the case of Beg. v. Peach,2 Salk. 572, a dissenting minister,
being qualified to preach under the Toleration Act, and being
illegally convicted for the exercise of his right, and supposing that
he would be further prevented from exercising his rig': to preach,
except at his peril of abiding a conviction therefor, applied for a
mandamus to be permitted to preach. Bat the writ was denied,
and the court held, "that a mandamus is always to do some act
in execution of law ;" whereas the writ, if issued ia that ease,
would be in the nature of a writ de won molestando. And in
accordance with this case, Ch. Baron ComyNs, in his Dig., t.
Mand. (B.), lays it down as settled, that a mandamus does not lie
to prevent a molestation against law. The same principle is stated
by Tapping in his work, as the settled law. Tapp on Mand. 189,
190.
Taking this to be an established principle'upon the subject,
there is no proper case stated in the petition of the appellees to
justify the issuing the writ. The application was founded entirely
upon an apprehension that the appellees might be disturbed or
molested in the exercise of some of the functions and powers that
have heretofore beloged, and may still pertain, to their office.
To grant the writ in such case, would be simply making it a substitute for an injunction.
We think the petition ought to be dismissed, and we shall therefore reverse the order appealed from, and dismiss the petition with
costs to the appellants.
It is thr undoubted runction of the
courts to deelarean act of the legislature
void which violates any constitutionaL
VOL. XXV -5

provision ; but it has been contended
that those provisions, when they refer
to the mode of passing acts, are diree-
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This subject has been dis-

cusscd at great length by Judge Cooi.Ey
in his work on Constitutional Limitations (third ed., pp. 78, 150), and by
Mr. Sedgwiek (Statutory and Constitutional Law, second ed., p. 316).
Theirconelusion is that the requirements
of the state constitutions in reference to
the passing of hills are mandatory; and
t lien the act itself shows that such requirements have not been complied with,
as when it has more than one subject,
or does not indicate the subject by the
title, the courts may declare it unconstitwional.
', Consitutions
do not
usually undertake to prescribe mere
rules of proceeding except when such
rul-s are looked upon as essential to
the thing to be done ; and they must
then be regarded in the light of limitations on the power to be exercised. * * *
If directions a",- given respecting the
times and modes of proceeding in which
a power should be exercised, there is at
least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in
that time and mode only :" Cooley on
Const. Lim. 78, 79. This reasoning
has been generally held conclusive:
See Pceople v. Purdy, 2 1lill 34, 36;
Puople v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 188;
Greencastle Township v. Black, 5 Ind.
566; State v. Johnson, 26 Ark. 281;
Boardof Supervisorsv. Ilecnan, 2 Mlinn.
330. Ohio and California are perhaps
the only states whose courts have construed constitutional provisions as directory only : Miller v. State, 3 Ohio N.
S. 475 ; Pint v. Nicholson, 6 Ohio N.
S. 177; l1'a.shington v. 1M.1urray, 4 Cal.
388. Tbe decision in the last case was
on the ground of custom, acquiesced in
until it had grown into law.
But when the act as attested is not
upon its face unconstitutional, there exizts a great difference of judicial opinion
in the question whether the courts may
go behind tit formal attestation and
hear evidence to ascertain whether the
constitutional requirements have been

complied with in the passing of the hill.
The arguments usually emnphoyed against
the reception of such evidence are that, in
all rules of procedure, the constitution
has imposed upon the conscience of the
legislature a duty with which tile courts
have no concern ; that the legislature is
a co-ordinate branch of the government,
and is the final judge as to the manner
in which the requirements of the organic law have been complied with ; and
that great mischief would result from
the confusion introduced into our statute
law by going behind the formal attestation. It may be noted that the dicta on
this subject have been more discordant
than the decisions, special circumstances
in many cases having induced the judges
to lay down a rule broader than was
necessary for the case in hand. The
following subdivisions may tend to harmonize the decisions -_
I. Mhen the attested Act is imprached
ly paret only.-Here the weight of
authority is that no inquiry into the
mode of passage will be permitted. The
dictum in Gardner v. 77Te Collector, 6
Wrall. 499, does not go to the lei-gth of
receiving unsupported parol evidence;
and such evidence has been rejected or
pronounced agai.nst in Wheeier v. City
af Philaddplia, I Weekly Notes 205 ;
Berry v. Balt. 6- Drunt Point Railroad,
41 31d. 446; La. State Co. v. R.ichoux,
23 La. Ann. 743; though it has
been received in 'cnnsylvania to show
that the legislature had exceeded its
power in granting a divorce for a cause
cognizable in the courts : Jones v. Jones,
2 Jones 350 ; Cronise v. Cronise, 4
Smith 262.
1I. Where the legislativejournals,kept
by the requirementsof the organic law, are
offernd to inipeach the Act.-Here there
is a conflict of authority. The decision
which mast ably ptesents the conclusiveattestation theory is perhaps in State ex
rel. Pangbarn v. Young, 32 N. J. 29,
where a mandamus was issued to enforce subinisston to the authority of the
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board constituted by an Act of Assembly. "Does not the legislature," said
BEASLEY, C. J., 1,possess the right of
declaring what shall be the supreme
evidence of the authenticity of its own
statutes? This question, in my opinion,
must be answered in the affirmative.
The body that passes a law must, of
necessity, promulgate it in some form.
* * * The power to certify to the public the laws itself has enacted, is one of
the trusts of the constitution to the legislature of the state." The argument
throughout is an elaborate one, and
presents the inconveniences which might
attend such inquiries by the judiciary in
the strongest light. To the same effect
is Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 522, and
Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 8, the latter
by a divided court. See also Green v.
Wdler, 32 Miss. 650; Pcop'ev. Devlin,
33 N. Y. 269; Duncombe v. Prindle, 12
Iowa 10, 11 ; Pac;fic Railroad v. Governor, 23 Mo. 353.
In a majority of cases the courts have
not hesitated to resort to the legislative
journals. In Pennsylvania, it was laid
down in Miles v. Stevens, 3 Barr 41,
that "the journals of Congress and of
the state legislatures are evidence in
this country in all public matters ;" and
&outhwark Bank v. Commonwealth, 26
Penn. State 450, shows that the court
way ascertain the intention of the lawmaking power by the journals. "If the
governor should, by mistake, sign a
bill which had never been enacted by
either house, the journals may be resorted to to correct the mistake." Per
LEwis, J. In South Carolina (State
v.Platt, 2 S. C. N. S. 150), Alabama
(Jones v. Hfutchinson, 43 Ala.'122),
Illinois (People v. Dv JVo(f, 62 Il1.
255), Georgia (Solomon v. The Commissioners, 41 Ga. 157), and Minnesota
(Board of Supervisors v. .cenan, 2
Minn. 330), the journals were consulted
to show either that the bill in question
had not been read twice, had not been
passed by a two-thirds majority, or had

not been signed by the executive within
the time prescribed by the organic law.
The earlier New York cases are to tile
same effect, and The People v. Dvlin,
supra, in which they are reviewed,
may be considered as overruled by People v. Allen, 42 N. Y. 378 ; at least to
the extent of deciding that the journals
may be consulted to ascertain whether
a given bill was passed by a constitutional majority. But the decision in
which the jurisdiction of the courts is
most amply vindicated is the Opinion of
the Justices, reported in 35 N. H. 579,
upon a case submitted to them by the
state legislature. A bill had been passed
by the House of Representatives of New
Hampshire, amended by the Senate, and
so passed, engrossed with the amendment by a joint committee of the houses,
signed by their presiding officers, and
approved by the governor. The journals of the houses were received in evidence, to show that the amended bill
had not been sent back to the lower
house, and the justices decided that the
act was null and void. " We are of
opinion," say the justices, " that
the journals which the constitution
thus requires * * * to be published
annually in the same manner as
the public laws, were intended to
furnish the courts and the public
with the means of ascertaining what
was actually done in and by each branch
of the legislature; not merely for the
purpose of enabling the people to judge
of the manner in which their public
servants have conducted themselves in
their office as legislators, but also for
the purpose of determining whether the
proceedings of the legislature have
been in conformity with the provisions
of the constitution ; that these journals,
under our constitution, are not to be
regarded as 4mere remembrances of proceedings,' but as authentic records of
proceedings, and that we may resort to
them in this case to ascertain whether
the two houses, in fact, concurred in the

86

LEGG

ET

AL. V. MAYOR, &c., OF ANNAPOLIS.

passage of tile before-mentioned act
that if it appears by tile
journals that
they dit] not, the primnd ./hci,' evidence
derived from an examination of tile
act
itself will he overcome."
Scc also the

are the common forum, and all jurisdiction not reserved by the constitution
would scem to belong to them. There
is not the slightest hint to the contrary
in any state constitution ; while, side
Ojilidm of te .htsfirts, 45 X. If.607,
hy side with the provisions which reguand (;ardr v. T, Collector, 6 Wall.
late time passing (if acts, and often min499, quoted in the principal case.
gled with them in the same section and
in Marvland the courts have assumed paragraph, are requirements, obedience
an intermediate position. By the con- to which can unquestionably be enforced
stitution of that state every bill must in the courts. The legislature is no
le engrossed after the second reading. doubt a co-equal body, but in the sense
In the earlier eases, Foke v. Femling, that it exercises a totally different func13 1d. 392, 412, and Mayor of Annaption. It makes the laws-the judiciary
olis v. Jlarwt,-d, 32 Md. 478, where the
passes upon and interprets them ; and
engrossed and the attested bill agreed,
the duty of deciding whether a legislano recourse was allowed to the journals
tive act is constitutioualily done appears
of the houses ; bit in Brrry v. Railroad to be comprised within the judicial
Co., 41 MId. 446, where the engrossed sphere. Nor is it any attack upon the
and the attested bill differed, and the dignity of the legislature to decide that
latter was contrary to the preamble of
a given bill was never passed by that
the statute, the journals were received
body. In no ease will evidence derogin evidence to show that the engrossed
atory to the character of the legislature
bill was that which actually passed the be received: Jones v. Jones, 2 Jones
hou-es. The decision was carefully
357. But the allegation is usually that
confined to tile exact point; and ALVr-, the bill in question did not pass the
J., after stating that pnrol evidence houses ; that by some error or fraud on
would not be received, adds : "Nor do the part of ministerial officers the bill
we decide in this case that the jour- was altered on passage or after passage,
nals of the two houses would he evi- so that the attested act is not that which
dence per se,upon which the validity was read to the members.
of a statute, having the required authenAs to the results sometimes predicted
tication, could be successfully questioned
from going behind the formal attestaas to the manner of its enactment. But tion, it may be said that in the states
we think the journals, in connection whose courts have taken jurisdiction, no
with other competent evidence on the such results have followed. On the
subject, may he examined as means of
contrary, the cases reported have been
information to aid in arriving at a cor- often of such a kind that a conspicuous
rect conclusion as to what was the action failure of justice would have resulted
of the legislature on any particular bill from a refusal to receive evidence dehors
before it." The principal case seems the attested statute. Jones v. Jones and
to carry the doctrine a step farther, and Berry v. Railroad Co., supra, are here
broadly adheres to Gardnerv. The Col- in point. 'Many cases, on the other
lecto'.
hand, in which the courts have declared
The argument that the legislature is their inability to go behind the record,
impliedly made the sole judge of tile could equally have been decidled upon
fulfilment of constitutional requisites in the weakness of the evidence : e- g.,
the passage of acts does not appear
Lottery Co. v. Richoux, supra. It is
sound. In the absence of any specially
conceded that every intendment is to be
organized tribunal, the courts of law
made in favor of the regular attestation ;
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and only in flagrant cases, therefore,
will an act so attested be impeached.
That the judges should deprive themselves of the power to administer relief
against the fraud of a clerk or a printer's blunder would be, it is submitted,
a public misfortune. The best doctrine
seems to be that by which the judiciary
reserves to itself a wise discretion. As
it is expressed in Gardner v. The Collector, " Whenever a question arises as

to the existence of a statute, or as to the
time when it took effect, or as to its precise terms, the judges who are called
upon to decide such question have a
right to resort to ny source of information which, in its nature, is capable
of conveying to the judicial mind a
clear and satisfactory answer to such
question ; the best and most satisfactory
evidence in allcases being required."
RICHARD S. HlUtNTER.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
HAMILTON v. MARKS

ET AL.

Fraud or illegality in the inception of a negotiable promissory note transferred
before maturity, will vitiate the same in the hands of a person having knowledge
of the fraud or illegality ; and ihen such fraud or illegality is established, the
burden of proof is devolved upon the holder, to show that he took the note in
good faith or for value.
But when such note is taken in good faith and for value, the holder is vested
with a good title, notwithstanding there may have been circumstances connected
with the transfer to him sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent man on inquiry.

PrLAINTiFF brought his action upon a negotiable promissory note
executed by the defendants to one T. I. Cooley, and by Cooley
assigned to plaintiff before maturity. The answer of the defendant set up a conditional sale of a farm to him by Cooley; that the
conveyance was made to him for the purpose of making the sale
to one Walker, and that the note -was executed to secure Cooley
in the faithful discharge by Marks of the trust; and that, in case
no sale should be made to Walker before the note became due, the
same was to be void.
The answer also set up a fraudulent conspiracy between Walker
and Cooley to sell the farm to him, and charged the plaintiff with
notice of the fraud. It was also averred that no value was given
in consideration of the assignment, &c. There was a replication
filed by the plaintiff, denying all the material allegations in the
answer, and upon the issues thus formed the trial was had. Both
parties gave evidence tending to establish their respective sides of
the case. There was a verdict for the defendants, upon which
judgment was rendered and the plaintiff appealed.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNER, J.-In order to understand and determine upon what

theory the case was tried, it will be necessary briefly to recur to
the material instructions given by the court. The nine propositions given on the request of the plaintiff, and the two first for the
defendants, cannot be subject to any contest, as they merely assert
what has long been established as the law in reference to the rights
and liabilities of parties to negotiable paper. But the remaining
instructions given for the defendants constitute the principal contention in the case, and are the ones to which plaintiff strenuously
objects. By the third instruction the jury are told that if they
believe from the evidence that the note in suit was obtained by
Cooley, the payee therein, by fraud practised by him upon the
defendant, Marks, or if the circumstances appearing in proof tend
to show that the transfer of the note by Cooley to Hamilton was
made by Cooley and accepted by Hamilton for the purpose of thereby gaining an advantage over defendants, then the burden of proof
rests upon the plaintiff in the case to show before he can recover that
he purchased said note of Cooley in good faith without notice or
knowledge of such fraud before the maturity of the note and paid
a valuable consideration therefor. The fourth instruction declares
that if the jury believe from the evidence that the note sued on
was obtained by Cooley from the defendant Marks by fraud or
fraudulent means used by Cooley, then in order to affect the plaintiff by notice of such fraud and render the note invalid in his
hands, it is not necessary that he should have actual and positive
knowledge of such fraud before the assignment of said note to him,
but that it is sufficient notice if it be such as ordinarily prudent
men usually act upon in the common affairs of life. The fifth instruction says that if from all the facts and circumstances given in
evidence, the jury believe that the note in suit was procured from
Marks by fraud, and they further believe that the plaintiff Hamilton, before or a the time of the actual assignment, transfer and
delivery of the note to him, and the actual payment of a valuable
consideration therefor knew of the existence of such fraud in the
procurement of the note, or was then conscious of having the
means of knowing and failed to use them, or failed or declined to
use that ordinary care and diligence which a prudent man usually
acts upon in the ordinary affairs of life, then the plaintiff is not a
purchaser of said note in good faith, without notice, and the jury
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should find for the defendants, although they may believe that
plaintiff, Hamilton, paid Cooley a valuation consideration for the
note. The sixth instruction asserts essentially the same proposition as embodied in the above, framed in different language.
The main questions of inquiry arising on the record, according
to the foregoing instructions, are, first, whether circumstances of
suspicion sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry, constitute
notice in regard to negotiable paper, and whether negligence or
want of care in the investigation of such circumstances can be imputed as notice, and further upon whom is the burden of proof
'hen it is charged and proved that the note was founded in fraud
so as to destroy its validity between the original parties, when it
is in the hands of an assignee, having been transferred before due.
This case was previously in this court on appeal from the Linn
County Court of Common Pleas (52 Mo. 78), and the doctrine then
announced was that, in order to let in equitable defences against
a note assigned before maturity, that express notice of the consideration before the assignment was made 'as not indispensable;
but that it would be sufficient if the circumstances were of such a
character as necessarily to cast a shade upon the transaction and
to put the holder upon inquiry. The instructions upon this point
followed the rule laid down above, and the plaintiff's counsel now
zealously insists that the principle declared is erroneous, and asks
that it should be re-examined. As a general proposition we should
be unwilling to accede to the request. It is fit and proper that
there should be an end to litigation, and when a rule has been
adjudged upon mature deliberation, and after solemn argument, it
ought to be considered as finally determined. When a case has
once been in the Appellate Court and is sent back, if it is retried
in conformity with the principle announced in the higher tribunal
and is again taken up, cogent and convincing reasons must exist to
induce a re-examination of what ought to be considered as res
judicata. But, in view of the fact that subsequent decisions of
this court, though not noticing or professing to overrule the decision in this case, are, in my opinion, inconsistent with it, and, considering the great importance of having some settled and stable
rule in reference to a question which so vitally concerns the business transactions of the whole community, it is deemed advisable to
depart from the usual practice and consider the question again.
When the case was here before, the judge who wrote the opinion

HAMILTON v. MARKS.

plac(d his chief reliance upon the authority of Pringle v. Philllps,
5 Sandf. 157, and the cases therein cited and reviewed by Judge
DuEm in his very elaborate and able opinion. The case of Pringle
v. _Phillils was decided in the Superior Court of New York city,
and has been expressly disapproved and repudiated by the Court
of Appeals in that state, as will be hereinafter shown. Its doctrine has never attained a fcundation in that great commercial
state. The case was an action of replevin in the detinet for the
recovery of merchandise which had come into the possession of the
defendant from a fraudulent vendee of the plaintiff, as security
for advances made, but, as alleged by the plaintiff, with notice of
the fraud, and the question now under consideration was not involved.
As England was the great commercial nation of the world, the
leading principles of mercantile or commercial law have been derived f.omi her courts. The general rule of common law was, that
except by a sale in market overt, no one could give a better title
to personal property than he himself had. But it was established
a' an early period that securities transferable by delivery were
excn'pt from this principle. In Lawson v. Meston, 4 Esp. 56,
Lord KENyoN said: "If there was any fraud in the transaction,
or if a bond fide consideration had not been paid for the bill by
the plaintiffs, to be sure they could not recover; but to adopt the
principle of the defence to the full extent stated, would be at once
to paralyze the circulation of all the paper in the country and with
it all its commerce. The circumstances of the bill having been
lost might have been material, if they could bring knowledge of
that fact home to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs might, or might
not, have seen the advertisement,- and it would be going at great
length to say that a banker was bound to make inquiry concerning
every bill brought to him for discount. It would apply as well to
a bill for 101. as for 10,0001." This doctrine of Lord KEXNYON was
not new. The same principle had been previously announced by
Lord HOLT in Anon., 1 Salk. 126; by Lord MANSFIELD in Miller
v. Race, 1 Burr. 452: ;-1 Grant v. F'aughan, 8 Id. 1516; and in
Peacock v. Rhodes, 2 Doug. 638; and was considered the wellsettled law.
But in the later case of Gill v. COubtt, 3 B. & C. 466, decided
in 1824, ABBOTT, Ch. J., upon the trial instructed the jury:
" That there were two questions for their consideration; first,
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whether the plaintiff had given value for the bill, of which there
could be no doubt, and secondly, whether he took under circumstances which ought to have excited the suspicion of a prudent and
careful man. If they thought he had taken the bill under such
circumstances, then, notwithstanding he had given full value for
it, they ought to find a verdict for the defendant."
The jury found for the defendant, and after a full argument
before the whole court, the charge was approved, and judgment
was entered upon the verdict. The rule established in Gill v.
Cubitt created great dissatisfaction in mercantile and commercial
circles, but.it was adhered to for a period of twelve years, or as
long as Chief Justice ABBOTT presided on the bench. He broke
in upon the ancient rule and established the doctrine, but it died
with his retirement.
In Crook v. Jadis,6 B. & Ad. 909, the doctrine received a very
material modification. The action was brought by the endorsee
of the bill against the drawer. It was held that it was "no defence that the plaintiff took the bill under circumstances which
ought to have excited the suspicions of a prudent man that it had
not been fairly obtained. The defendant must show that the plaintiff was guilty of gross negligence."
This last case was affirmed in Backhouse v. Harrison,5 B. &
Ad. 1098, and one of the judges (PATTESON) earnestly assailed
the case of Gill v. Cubitt. Finally, a step further was taken in
Goodman v. 17arvey, 4 Ad. & E. 870, and the rule- in Gill v.
Cubitt was utterly rejected and repudiated; Lord DENMAN, speakfor the whole Court of King's Bench, used the following language:
"I believe we are all of opinion that gross negligence only would
not be a sufficient answer where the party has given a consideration for the bill. Gross negligence may be evidence of mala fides,
but it is not the same thing. We have shaken off the last remnant
of the contrary doctrine. Where the bill has passed to the plaintiff without any proof of bad faith in him, there is no objection
to his title." This last case was decided in 1886. It was reaffirmed in ther v. Rich, 10 Ad. & E. 784, decided in 1889, and
again in Arbonin v. Anderson, 1 Q. B. 498, 504, decided in 1841,
and has ever since been the undisputed law of England.
The Supreme Court of the United States has adopted the rule
announced in Goodman v. Rarvey, to its fullest extent. The
Vur,. XXV -6
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question first came before the tribunal in Swift X. Tyson, 16 Pet.
1, and Goodman v. 11arvey, and the class to which it belongs were
followed. In the case of Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 44.,
Judge CLIFFORD, writing the opinion of the whole court, gave the
subject, both upon the authorities and upon principle, the most
elaborate and exhaustive examination that is anywhere to be found
in the books. -From that case the following propositions are
deducible : 1. The possession of negotiable paper carries the title
with it to the holder ; 2. The party who takes it before due for a
valuable consideration, without knowledge of any defect of title,
and in good faith, holds it by a title valid against all the world; 3.
Suspicion of defect of title, or the knowledge of circumstances
which would excite such suspicion in the mind of a prudent man,
or gross nagligence on the part of the taker, at the time of the
transfer, will not defeat his title. That result can be produced
only by bad faith on his part ; 4. The burden of proof lies on the
person who assails the right claimed by the party in possession.
This case was followed by The Bank of Pittsburgh v. Neal, 22
How. 96, and again in Mturray v. Lardner,2 Wall. 110, the question was considered and the cases reviewed, and Goodman v.
Simonds was affirmed by the whole court.
In New York the same principle is fully adopted: ifagee v.
Badger, 34 N. Y. 247. In the case of the Belmont Branch Bank
v. Hloge, 35 N. Y. 65, Mr Justice PORTER, in giving the opinion of
the court, says: "Upon the facts proved, it is manifest that the
jury were right in finding that the defendants were bond fide
holders of the paper in question." The instructions of the learned
judge on this branch of the case were more favorable to the plaintiffs than the law would strictly.justify. He gave them the benefit of the assumption that, though the defendants took the paper
from the apparent owners for value, before it became due, and
without notice of any defect in their title, the plaintiffs could reclaim their bills if they proved the existence of circumstances which
would have been likely to excite the suspicions of a cautious and
vigilant purchaser. We cannot accept this as an accurate exposition of the rule applicable to the transfer of commercial paper,
though it is in accordance with antecedent decisions in the Superior
Court: .Kentgen v. Parks, 2 Sandf. 60; Pringle v. Pillips,5
Id. 157; Danforth v. Dart, 4 Duer 101.
We had occasion to express our views on this question in the
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case of lagee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 247. "One who for full value
obtains from the apparent owner a transfer of negotiable paper
before it matures, and who has no notice of any equitics between
the original parties, or of any defect in the title of the presumptive
owner, is to be deemed a bond fide holder. lIe does not owe to
the party who puts such paper in circulation the duty of active
inquiry to avert the imputation of bad faith. The rights of the
holder are to be determined by the simple test of honesty and good
faith, and not by the mere speculation as to his probable diligence
or negligence. The authority mainly relied on in the exceptional
cases which have favored an opposite theory, is the decision in
( ill v. Cubitt, 3 B. & 0. 466. The doctrine of that case has been
repeatedly overruled, as well in the English as in the American
courts; and it cannot be recognised as authority without sanctioning an unwise innovation in our system of commercial law."
The question was again discussed in Seybel v. _Nat. Cur. Bank, 54
N. Y. 288, and the doctrine above announced was reiterated.
The same principle is established in Pennsylvania. In Phelan
v. i3loss, 67 Penn. St. 59, after an elaborate discussion, it was held
that a purchaser before due and without notice of a negotiable promissory note, fraudulent as between the original parties, obtained a
title thereto, although he took it under circumstances which ought
to have excited the suspicions of a prudent man.
. The case of Lake v. Reed, 29 Iowa 258, is to the same effect.
See also Raphael v. Bank of -England,17 C. B. 161; Wlorcester
County Bank v. Dorchester Bank, 10 Cush. 488; Brush v. Scribner, 11 Conn. 388; Woolfolk v. Bank qf America, 10 Bush. 504.
In this state, in Horton v. Bayne, 52 Mo. 531, it was held that
an endorser of negotiable paper before maturity was presumed to be
the owner in good faith and for value, unless there were circumstances antecedent to, or attendant on, the act of transfer, amounting to either actual notice to the holder of fraud, illegality or failure of consideration, or such a combination of suspicious circumstances as would, in legal contemplation, afford ground for the
presumption that the purchaser of the paper was aware at the time
of its acquisition of some equity between the original parties which
should have prevented its purchase. And in Merrick v. Phillips,
58 Mo. 436, it was decided that the consideration of a negotiable
promissory note in the hands of a innocent holder for value could
hot be inquired into, and before the consideration could be im-
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peached it was necessary to show that the holder had notice of the
lack of consideration.
It is conceded that in the United States the decisions of the
courts have varied. Formerly a good many of the courts followed
the princ.iple established in Gill v. C'ubdt, and a few of them still
adhere io the rule therein declared, but by far the greater number
now concur in the doctrine which has been firmly settled in England and the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the
courts of all the leading commercial states of the Union: Redf.
& Big. Lead. Cas. 257; 1 Daniell Nego. Instr., § 775.
The rule that a purchaser is not an innocent holder if there are
circumstances connected with the transfer sufficient to put an ordinarily prudent man on inquiry is uncertain and devoid of uniformity. Suspicions assert themselves in different ways in different
minds. In like manner what is to be deemed prudence will be
found to vairy with different persons. One innocent holder may
be more or less suspicious under similar circumstances at one time
than another. So, too, one prudent man may also suspect when
another would not, and the standard of the jury may be higher
or lower than that of other men equally prudent in the management of their affairs.
In any view, therefore, both upon principle and authority, and
from the experience of jurists and commercial men, and the interests of the affairs of business life, it is safe to say that the
liberal doctrine which promotes the free circulation of negotiable
instruments is the best, and that the good faith of the transaction
should be the decisive test of the holder's rights. It follows that
the court's instruction upon the question of notice was wrong.
The next question is as to the burden of proof in case it was
found that the note had its inception in fraud. In the last edition
of Story on Promissory Notes it is laid down that if the maker
proves that the note had been obtained from him by fraud or was
fraudulently put in circulation by the payee, the holder must prove
that lie took it honestly without knowledge of the fraud, and it
may then be incumbent on him to show that he has given value
for it (Story Prom. Notes, 6th ed., § 196). The rule is stated very
distinctly and clearly by Greenleaf (2 Greenl. Ev., § 172), where
he says: " Even in an action by tme endorsee against an original
party to a bill, if it be shown on the part of the defendant that
the bill was made under duress, or that he was defrauded of it, or
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if a strong suspicion of fraud be raised, the plaintiff will then be
required to show under what circumstances, and for what value,
he became the holder. It is, however, only in -such cases that
this will be demanded of the holder; it will not be required where
the defendant shows nothing more than a mere want of consideration on his part."
For the propositions above stated, the learned authors cite many
cases. In Bailey v. Bidwell, 13 M. & W. 73, Baron PARKE says:
"It certainly has been, since the later cases, the universal understanding that if the note were proved to have been obtained by
fraud or affected by illegality, that afforded a presumption that
the person who had been guilty of the illegality would dispose of
it, and would place it in the hands of another person to sue upon
it ; and that such proof casts upon him, plaintiff, the burden of
showing that he was a bondfide holder for value." In Smith v.
Brain, 16 Q. B. 244, the case of Bailey v. Bidwell was commented on and approved, and Lord CAIPBELL, C. J., said that
since the new rules, judges have with entire approbation directed
juries that when the bill was illegal in its inception, or when the
immediate endorser to the plaintiff obtained possession of it by
fraud, the want of consideration as between him 'and the plaintiff
may be presumed, and in such case the onus ie cast upon the plaintiff of proving that he gave value. In the subsequent case of
Harvey v. Towers, in the Court of Exchequer, 6 Exch. 656,
the same rule was enforced, PLATT, B., observing that the cases
of Bailey v. Bidwell, and Smith v. Brain, were the decisions of
eight judges, and that the casting the burden of proving consideration on the holder of a bill showh to be effected by fraud, was an
extremely just rule, as he must best know what consideration he
gave for it. In Hall v. Peatherstone, 3 H. & N. 284, POLLOCK,
(. B., says: "If there are any circumstances in the nature of
fraud or illegality, which can be left to the jury, proof of these
circumstances will cast on the plaintiff the onus of showing that
he gave value for the bill." And BRAMWELL, B., said: "The
cases have established that if there be fraud or illegality in
the inception of a bill, or in the circumstances under which it was
taken by the person who endorsed it to plaintiff, he must prove
consideration. That is established beyond controversy."
The same doctrine has received the unqualified assent and
approbation of the Supreme Court of the United States.
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In the case of Smith v. Lac County, 11 Wall. 189, it is expressly
decided that in a suit on a negotiable security, when the defendant
has shown strong circumstances of fraud in the origin of the instrument, this casts upon the holder the necessity of showing that he
gave value for it before maturity. In Ohio (,Melfisson v. Stanberry,
3 Ohio St. 156), the rule is stated to be that, where it is shown
that the transaction on the part of the original holder was a positive fraud, then it devolves on the party claiming under such
transaction to show that he acted honestly without a knowledge
of the fraud. SAVAGE, C. J., in JVallett v. Parker,6 Wend. 615,
says: " The holder of a note or bill need not. in the first instance,
show a consideration-possession proves property; but if there
are any suspicious circumstances as to the bona fide8 of his possession, and the defendant has a good defence against the payee, then
le must show that he paid value for it. For instance, if the note
has been lost or stolen, or fraudulently put into circulation, &c.,
then the plaintiff must show that he came lawfully and fairly by
it, and paid value for it." In -Monroev. Cooler, 5 Peck 412, the
court declares: "We agree that a new trial in this case must
be granted, for the purp.ose of allowing the defendants to prove,
if they can, that there was fraud practised in the inception of the
note, or that it was fraudulently put in circulation. This fact
being established will throw upon the plaintiff the burden of proof
to show that he came by the possession of the note fairly and
without any knowledge of the fraud ;" and in ifolme v. Karsper,
5 Binn. 469, the court said: " In the first instance it is presumed
that every man acts fairly. It lies on the defendant, therefore,
to show some probable ground of suspicion before the plaintiff is
expected to do anything more than produce the note on which he
founds his action. But this being done, it is reasonable that the
holder should be called upon to rebut the suspicion. All that is
asked of him is to show that he has acted fairly and paid value."
The latest elementary writer on this subject thus sums up the rule
as the settled law: "There may be at this juncture a shifting of
the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff, for the
principle is well established that if the maker or acceptor, who is
primarily liable for payment of the instrument, or any party bound
by the original consideration, proves that there was fraud or illegality in the inception of the instrument ; or if the circumstances
raise a strong suspicion of fraud or illegality, the owner must then
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respond by showing that lie acquired it londfide for value, in the
usual course of business while current, and under circumstances
which create no presumption that he knew the facts which impeach
its validity. This principle is obviously salutary, for the presumption is natural that an instrument so issued would be quickly
transferred to another, and unless he gave value which could be
easily proved, if given, it would perpetuate great injustice and
reward fraud to permit him to recover :" 1 Daniell Nego. Instr.,

§ 815.
The reasoning by which the foregoing rule is supported is, I think,
unanswerable, and commends itself for its manifest justice. Where
an instrument is procured by fraud, or is affected with illegality,
the payee would undoubtedly be eager to transfer it, so that suit
would be brought in the name of another, in order to prevent any

valid defence if possible.
In such a case it is justice to the defendant, and it is no hardship to the plaintiff, to require him to show that in acquiring the
note he acted honestly and in good faith, and that he gave value
for it.
On this point, therefore, in giving the third instruction
for the defendant, I think the court decided rightly. There are
no other questions in the record requiring attention, or to which
any objection is perceived. For the giving of the fourth, fifth and
sixth instructions, on behalf of the defendants, in regard to the

question of diligence and notice by the plaintiff, I think the judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded.
The decisions of the Supreme Court
of Missouri in regard to negotiable paper have recently been very conflicting.
In lashington Sainys Bank v. Ekey, 12
Amer. Law Reg. 625, s. c. 51 3Mo.
272, this court held that the alteration
of a negotiable promissory note after its
execution, by filling blanks in a printed
form, so as to make the note draw interest at a given rate from date, avoids
the note in the hands of an innocent
holder for value, who has received the
same before maturity in good faith and
for value. In Hamilton Y. Marks, 52
Mo. 7S, it was held that a negotiable
promissory note, transferred before
maturity, under circumstances which

would cast a shade upon the transaction
and put the holder on inquiry in regard
to equities existing between the original
parties, is held subject to such equities.
Both of these decisions materially
embarrassed and endangered the free
and safe circulation of commercial paper, and have been highly unsatisfactory
to the bar, as well as the business community. The first one has been very recently substantially overruled: CapitalBank
v. Armstrong' 62 Mo. 59, and Iron
Mountain Bank. 4-c., v. .lMardock and
Armstrong, 15 Amer. Law Ieg. N. S.
733 ; and now, by the above reported
case, the doctrine of the last is entirely
swept away.
H. B. JouxsoN-.
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Unhited States District Court, Southern District (f Ohio.
CATI. STAI'LETON, ADM'X, v. E. P. REYNOLDS

ET AL.

In a suit by a plaintiff of one state against several defendants of a different
state, where the sum in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of five hundred dollars, where the matter in controversy is wholly between them, and can be
fully determined between the plaintiff and the defendants, either of the defendants,
nctu~ally
interested in the controversy, may, under the Act of Congress of March
3d 1875, remove such suit to the Circuit Court of the United States.
The removal of a suit by one of the defendants under such circumstances removes it as to all of the defendants, and it is not necessary that all of the defendants should join in the petition for removal.

MoTION to remand the cause to the Superior Court of Cincinnati.
Colston, for plaintiff.
sSaylor, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Swixa, J.-The following facts appear from the record in tte
cause: On the 18th day of November 1875, the plaintiff filed
her petition in the Superior Court of Cincinnati, against the
defendants, E. P. Reynolds, Thomas Saulspaugh, W. B. Shute
and John Creupaugh, partners, as Reynolds, Saulspaugh & Co.
The petition statas in substance, that Daniel Stapleton, whilst
in the employ of the defendants, in the construction of the bridge
across the Ohio river for the Southern Railroad, through their
negligence was killed; that he left the plaintiff, his widow, and three
children, and claims ten thousaud dollars damages, for which judgment is asked.
On the 18th day of November 1875, a summons was issued,
which was served personally upon the defendant, E. P. Reynolds,
on the 19th of November, and as to the other defendants, returned
"not found ;" on the 29th of November, a second summons was
issued, which was returned on the 13th day of December as to all
the defendants "not found."
On the 18th day of December, the defendant, E. P. Reynolds,
filed his separate answer, stating "that it was in his personal
capacity, and that he did not appear for his co-defendants, or for
the firm," and denying the material allegations of the petition.
On the 6th day of March 1876, a third summons was issued,
which was served personally upon the defendant, John Creupaugh,
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on the 9th of Harch, and returned "not found" as to the other
defendants. On the 20th day of March a fourth summons was
issued, which was returned on the 3d of April "not found ;" on
the 5th of April a fifth summons was issued, which was served
personally upon the defendl-irt, Thomas Saulspaugh, on the 15th
of April, and on the 20th 3f April returned -'riot ,ound" as to
the defendant W. B. Shute. On the 7th day of April, John
Oreupaugh filed his answer, the mrae in reserv.tion and denial as
that of E. P. Reynolds. On the 19th day of Apii a sixth summons was issued, which was on the 23d day of April served upon
the defendant AV. B. Shute.
On the 4th day of May the defendant Thomas Saulspaugh,
filed his separate answer, the same in reservation and denial as
that of the defendant E. P. Reynolds. On the 4th day of May
E. P. Reynolds filed his motion for security for costs, which was
granted by the court on the 8th day of May, and which was given
on the same day. On the 6th of May, the defendant W. B. Shute,
not entering his appearance for any other purpose than the motion,
filed his motion to set aside the service of the summons upon him,
which motion was overruled by the court on the 20th (lay of May,
and a bill of exceptions was taken on the same day to the overruling thereof, and on the same day a default for answer was entered
by the clerk against him, which default, on the 29th day of May,
was set aside, and five days given him within which to answer.
On the 2d day of June the defendants Thomas Saulspaugh and
W. B. Shute filed their petition for removal of the cause. into the
Circuit Court of the United States. The petition alleges that all
of the defendants are citizens of the state of Illinois, and that the
plaintiff is a citizen ofthe state of Kentucky; that the controversy
in suit is wholly between citizens of different states, which can be
determined between them, and that the matter in dispute exceeds
the sum of five hundred dollars exclusive of costs; that the cause
has not been tried and the petition is filed at the term of the court
at which it could first be tried. A good and sufficient bond was
filed and, on the 14th day of June, the Superior Court, upon hearing of the petition for removal, found all the allegations of the
petition to be true, and ordered the cause to be removed to the
Circuit Court of the United States. On the 1st of July, the plaintiff filed in the Superior Court her motion to set aside the order
of removal, and on the 3d day of October 1876, being the 1st
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day of the October Term, the defendant filed in the Circuit Court
of the United States the transcript of the record in said cause,
and on the same day the plaintiff filed her motion to remand the
cause to the Superior Court, first as to all of the defendants, second
as to the def-ndants Reynohld, Saulspa-ig-! and Creupaugh.
The phintiff c:ait,.i t!,at tie uaus6 shall be remanded, because
the petition for removal was not .112d by all of the defendants, at
the first term at which it could have been tried. But if the court
should be of the opinion that it should not be remanded as to all
the defendants, then that it should be remanded as to all except W.
B. Shute, who it is admitted filed his petition for removal within
the time prescribed by the law.
The record shows that as to all the defendants, except W. B.
Shute, the cause was at issue before the June term of the Superior
Court, and if a separate trial could have been had as to each
defendant, such trial could have been had at a term before the
June term at which the removal was made; that no such trial was
demanded or claimed by either party, until the defendants were all
served with process and issue joined as to each of them, the record
also shows that but two of the defendants joined in the petition
for the removal of the suit.
That the suit was removable by the defendant W. B. Shute,!
think clear from the provisions of the Act of March 3d 1875,
regulating the removal of causes to the Circuit Court of the United
States; the act, after providing that the amount in dispute shall
exceed, exclusive of costs, the sum of five hundred dollars, and
shall be between citizens of different states, says: "and when in
any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a controversy
which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can
be fully determined between them, then either one or more of the
plaintiffs or defendants actually interested in such controversy
may remove said suit to the Circuit Court of the United States
for the proper district."
The record shows that the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive
of costs, the sum of five hundred dollars; that it is wholly between
citizens of different states, and can be fully determined between
them, and that W. B. Shute is actually interested in the controversy. Possessing all these requisites, the defendant W. B. Shute
and this suit are clearly brought within the express language of
the act.

